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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
RULE 405: METHODS OF PROVING
CHARACTER
Federal Rule of Evidence 405 states:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or
a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific
instances of that person's conduct. 1
The purpose of Rule 405 is to determine the proper form of
character evidence once the court has decided, pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 4042 and 403,3 that such evidence is
1. FED. R. EviD. 405.
2. FED. R. EvID. 404. Rule 404 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
Id.
3. FED. R. Evm. 403. Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
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admissible. 4 Under Rule 404, evidence of character or a
character trait of the accused, the victim, or a witness may be
admissible in certain situations. 5 Thus, Rule 405 is applied to
determine the proper method of proving character when the
character of an individual is admissible. 6 Federal Rule of
Evidence 405 potentially allows three methods of proving

character: "testimony as to reputation," "testimony in the form
of an opinion," and testimony as to "specific instances of
conduct." 7 Normally, character can be shown only by evidence

of reputation or opinion. 8 Evidence of specific instances may
only be admitted when a person's character is in issue under the
substantive law because this type of evidence is "the most

convincing" and "possesses the greatest capacity to arouse
prejudice, to confuse, [and] to surprise." 9 Thus, when character

4. United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 855 (9th Cir.) (stating that
"[a]fter a court determines that character evidence is admissible under Rule
404, it must next turn to Rule 405 to determine what form that evidence may
take"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 676 (1995); United States v. Talamante, 981
F.2d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Federal Rule of Evidence 405
establishes the permissible methods of proving character under Rule
404(a)(2)"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1041 (1993); United States v. Barry, 814
F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[a] defendant may offer
evidence of 'a pertinent trait of his character' under Rule 404(a)(1); this
evidence
may
take
the
form
of
testimony
as
to
reputation ... or... opinion.., under Rule 405(a)"); Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Grant, 775 F.2d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]he
methods by which character evidence may be introduced are prescribed by
Fed.R.Evid. 405").
5. FED. R. EvID. 404.

6. FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's note. The Advisory
Committee's Note states that "[t]he rule deals only with allowable methods of
proving character, not with the admissibility of character evidence, which is
covered in Rule 404." Id.
7. FED. R. EVID. 405.
8. Id.
9. FED. R. Evil. 405 advisory committee's note. It should also be noted

that evidence in the form of opinion and reputation is also available if the
character of the person is the primary issue. Id. In addition, the rule provides
that questions pertaining to particular instances of conduct can be asked on
cross-examination if they are relevant. FED. R. EvID. 405.
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is not directly in issue, character evidence is limited to testimony
concerning reputation or opinion. 10
The admission of reputation testimony pursuant to Rule 405 is

consistent with the federal common law. 11 Under the early
common law, testimony concerning the defendant's reputation
was confined to the reputation in the community in which the
defendant lived.12 The common law now allows reputation
testimony from any community that the person is actively a part
of. 13 In addition, reputation testimony may be limited to the time
14
when the alleged offense was committed.

The admissibility of opinion testimony, however, departs from
the common law doctrine. 15 The distinction between reputation
10. FED. R. EviD. 405 advisory committee's note. The Advisory
Committee has stated that "[w]hen character is used circumstantially and hence
occupies a lesser status in the case, proof may be only by reputation and
opinion." Id. See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). In
Michelson, the Court distinctly stated when referring to character evidence that
"[t]he witness may not testify about defendant's specific acts or courses of
conduct.. .

."

Id. at 477. However, the Court noted that the witness may

testify as to "what he has heard in the community ... ." Id.
11. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note (stating that "[t]his
treatment is, with respect to... reputation, conventional contemporary
common law doctrine").
12. The scope of the term "community" initially applied to the defendant's
reputation in the community where he resided. See Baugh v. State, 117 So.
426, 429 (Ala. 1928) (stating that "[tihere was nothing in the evidence to show
that the defendant had a known reputation outside of the community where he
lived, and the court will not be put in error for limiting the inquiry to that
neighborhood or community").
13. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 191, at 815 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). McCormick asserts that "increas[ed]
urbanization has prompted the acceptance of evidence as to reputation within
other substantial groups of which the accused is a constantly interacting
member, such as the locale where defendant works." Id.
14. Id.; United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 268 (3d. Cir 1981) (stating
that "[i]n dealing with community reputation for a trait of character ... it has
long been settled that reputation reasonably contemporaneous with the acts
charged is relevant, but that reputation after the criminal charge under
consideration is not"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982).
15. FED. R. EviD. 405 advisory committee's note (stating that "[in
recognizing opinion as a means of proving character, the rule departs from
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and opinion evidence is clear. Reputation evidence is testimony
as to the general reputation of the person in the community,
whereas opinion evidence is the personal opinion of the witness
concerning the person's character. 16 Any such opinion testimony
must be limited to "the nature and extent of observation and
17
acquaintance upon which the opinion is based."
Once the character of a person has been placed in issue on
direct examination, Rule 405 authorizes inquiries into particular
instances of conduct by the person during cross-examination of
the character witness. 18 The purpose of these questions is to help
the jury determine the reliability of the testimony given by the
character witness. 19 This rationale is based on the premise that
because the witness has related opinion testimony or reputation

usual contemporary practice in favor of that of an earlier day"). See United
States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 620 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[e]vidence of opinion is competent to prove character or a trait of
character under the Federal Rules of Evidence [which constitutes] a major
departure from the common law"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 106 (1982).
16. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir.
1992) (distinguishing between reputation and opinion evidence, but concluding
that Rule 405 also permits inquiry into specific instances of conduct on crossexamination regardless of whether the witness is testifying as to reputation or
opinion). See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948)
(describing opinion as a person's "own acquaintance, observation, and
knowledge of defendant [that] leads to his own independent opinion that
defendant possesses a good general or specific character[,]" while stating that
reputation is "what [the persoi] has heard in the community, although much of
it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself").
17. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.

18. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 191 at 816
("[O]nce the defendant gives evidence of pertinent character traits to show that
he is not guilty, his claim of possession of these traits - but only these traits - is
open to rebuttal by cross-examination .

. . .")

(citations omitted).

19. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note. See United States v.
Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that "relevant specific
instances of conduct [that are admissible on cross-examination] are only
instances going to the accuracy of the character wintesses' testimony"), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982).
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testimony, the cross-examination should "shed light on the
20
accuracy of [the witness'] hearing and reporting."
United States v. Talamante2 1 illustrates the application of Rule
405. In Talamante, a defendant charged with assault attempted to
introduce testimony of specific instances of conduct which would
indicate that the victim was the first aggressor. 22 The Tenth
Circuit held that the testimony was inadmissible. 23 The court
reasoned that when testimony is used to "create an inference that
a person acted in conformity with his or her character, Rule 405
allows proof of character only by reputation and opinion," and
not through specific instances of conduct.24
In United States v. Oshatz,25 the defendant, a tax attorney, was
charged in a sixteen-count indictment for his role in the securities
trading activities of several partnerships. 26 The charges included
conspiring to defraud the government of the United States,
engaging in securities transactions that were fraudulent, and
filing bogus tax returns for different partnerships. 27 The Second
Circuit held that the trial court properly allowed the testimony of
a character witness who gave opinion testimony concerning the
defendant's truthfulness and honesty during cross-examination by
defense counsel. 2 8 However, the court determined that cross20. Id. It has been asserted, however, that "[t]he extent and nature of the
cross-examination demands restraint and supervision... [and] [the court
should... determine whether there is a substantial basis for the crossexamination." MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 191 at 817 (citations omitted).
21. 981 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1041 (1993).
In Talamante, the defendant was arrested and convicted for assaulting an
acquaintance after an altercation occurred between the two men. Id. at 1154-

55.
22. Id. at 1155. The testimony consisted of statements alleging that the

defendant was stabbed by two friends of the victim on two separate occasions,
that the defendant's brother killed a friend of the victim, and that the victim
assaulted a number of individuals. Id.
23. Id. at 1157.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
912 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 (1991).
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 537. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Id. at 543.
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examination of non-expert character witnesses with hypothetical
questions that assume the guilt of the defendant is prohibited,
even though the questions could be relevant to the reliability of
29
the testimony of the character witness.
The Second Circuit has also addressed the issue of whether
questions regarding specific instances of conduct are permissible
on cross-examination. In United States v. Wallach,30 the court
held that, pursuant to Rule 405, it is permissible "to ask
questions of character witnesses concerning their knowledge of
specific instances of the defendant's conduct" on crossexamination. 3 1 However, the court noted that the district court
must exercise its discretion before admitting such collateral
evidence "to ensure that the jury does not convict the defendant
for conduct with which he has not been charged." 3 2 In Wallach,
the prosecutor was permitted to introduce evidence during cross29. Id. at 539-41. The court of appeals found that, although "a guiltassuming hypothetical question might be probative of the credibility of
testimony given by a non-expert

character

witness[,] ...

such cross-

examination is nevertheless to be prohibited because it creates too great a risk
of impairing the presumption of innocence." Id. at 539. Thus, the court of
appeals found that the trial court erred in repeatedly allowing the prosecution
to cross-examine the defendant's character witness as to "aspects of the
wrongdoing alleged to constitute the offenses for which [the defendant] was on
trial." Id. at 537. See United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir.
1993) (stating that "[wie are in harmony with all circuits, except one,
that ... condemned the use of guilt-assuming hypothetical questions asked of
lay character witnesses . . . ."); United States v. Morgan, 554 F.2d 31, 34 (2d

Cir.)

(stating that "[i]nsofar

as non-expert

character

witnesses

are

concerned ...the probative value of a hypothetical question ... is negligible
and ... [they] should not be asked"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).

30. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d 912 (1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2414 (1993). In Wallach, the court of appeals reversed the
convictions of the defendants who were charged with mail fraud, racketeering,
transporting stolen property interstate, and conspiracy to violate federal law.
Id. at 449-50.

31. Id. at 472.
32. Id. "The district court always has the authority and discretion to
exclude such evidence under ...

[Rule] 403." Id. Rule 403 states in pertinent

part that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .

. . ."

FED. R.

EVID. 403.
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performance as the

attorney in a personal injury case involving two young children
who were severely burned. 33 More specifically, the government

elicited evidence that the defendant agreed to a $1.7 million
settlement, while retaining a fee of $1 million. 34 Additionally,
the prosecutor, characterizing the defendant's actions as an
"outrage," invited the jurors "to stand in the shoes of the parents
of the [burned] children." 35 The court held that although the
evidence was "technically" admissible, the prosecutor's attempts
to blatantly prejudice the jury went "well beyond the bounds of
propriety and relevance" and should not have been admitted for
36
this purpose.
New York follows a different rule regarding the permissible
methods of proving character or a trait of character. New York
allows a defendant to establish good character only through his or
her "general reputation in the community." 37 Thus, New York
does not allow evidence in the form of an opinion.
The New York rule originates from People v. Van Gaasbeck,3 8
where the court of appeals held that "'character means the
estimate in which the individual is held by the community, and
not the private opinion ... of. . . the witnesses. . . . '"39 In
33. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 472.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 472-73.
36. Id.
37. People v. Barber, 74 N.Y.2d 653, 655, 541 N.E.2d 394, 395, 543
N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1989) (Titone, J., dissenting). The majority in Barber
held that the defendant was not entitled to submit a supplemental pro se
appellate brief addressing admissibility of character evidence. Id. at 654, 541
N.E.2d at 394, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 365. In his dissent, Judge Titone stated that
he could not concur without "commenting upon the significant evidentiary
argument defendant has made." Id. at 655, 541 N.E.2d at 394, 543 N.Y.S.2d
at 365. Judge Titone then proceeded to intensely criticize the New York
common law rule regarding the methods of proving character. Id. at 656-57,
541 N.E.2d at 395-96, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67 (Titone, J., dissenting).
38. 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907).
39. Id. at 416, 82 N.E. at 720 (citing Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471
(1885)).
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deciding that evidence based on the observation and personal
knowledge of a witness is not admissible, the court reasoned that,
if admissible, the truth of specific instances of the defendant's
40
conduct relied on by the witness would be difficult to ascertain.
Further, the court believed that the admission of such evidence
"would lead to the introduction into the case of innumerable
collateral issues which could not be tried out without introducing
the utmost complication and confusion into the trial, tending to
distract the minds of the jurymen and befog the chief issue in
litigation. "41
The Van Gaasbeck rule was upheld by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Bouton.42 The court in Bouton noted that
"[w]hile the nature of the defendant's character is the object of
the proof, reputation ... is the raw material from which that
character may be established." 43 In addition, in determining that
reputation evidence does not have to be confined to the
community the person lives in, the court stated that "[a]
reputation may grow wherever an individual's associations are of
such quantity and quality as to permit him to be personally
observed by a sufficient number of individuals to give reasonable
assurance of reliability. " 44 The court also decided that "the fact
that the [testimony] consisted solely of 'negative evidence' -- i.e.,
the absence of adverse comment on the pertinent aspects of
defendant's character -- could not in itself be the basis for an
exclusionary ruling."45
40. Id. at 418, 82 N.E. at 721.
41. Id.
42. 50 N.Y.2d 130, 405 N.E.2d 699, 428 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1980). In
Bouton, the defendant was convicted of sodomy in the first and second degrees
and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Id. at 134, 405 N.E.2d at
700, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
43. Id. at 139, 405 N.E.2d at 703, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 222. See also People
v. Alamo, 23 N.Y.2d 630, 634, 246 N.E.2d 496, 497, 298 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683

(stating that "[r]eputation, from the speech of people, is treated as a
fact ... established by witnesses in a position to have knowledge"), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
44. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d at 139-40, 405 N.E.2d at 704, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
223 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 140, 405 N.E.2d at 704, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
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In People v. Kuss,4 6 the court of appeals stated that the New

York rule is "slightly different" when dealing with the crossexamination of character witnesses. 47 The court held that when
the credibility of the witness is at issue, the witness may be
cross-examined as to the "existence of rumors or reports of
particularacts allegedly committed by the defendant which are

inconsistent with the reputation [the witness has] attributed to
him."48 The court warned that the use of specific instances can
only be used to indicate "the ability of the witness to accurately

reflect the defendant's reputation in the community," and "cannot
be used to prove the truth of the rumors." 4 9 This policy is in
accord with Rule 405 and its justifications.
There is a clear distinction between Federal Rule of Evidence
405 and New York law concerning the introduction of evidence
proving the character of both witnesses or parties. Under federal

law, a witness who is attempting to prove the character or a
character trait of a person is permitted to do so by either opinion
or reputation testimony. 50 New York's evidentiary principle, by

comparison, only permits a witness to testify as to the person's
reputation. 5 1 New York law does not permit testimony in the
form of an opinion. 5 2 The New York rule has been criticized as
46. 32 N.Y.2d 436, 299 N.E.2d 249, 345 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 913 (1974). In Kuss, the defendant, a councilman and Town
Board member, and his co-defendant were convicted of taking unlawful fees.
Id. at 440, 442, 299 N.E.2d at 251, 252, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 1004, 1006. The
trial court allowed "[twelve] character witnesses to testify as to [the codefendant's] good reputation for honesty and integrity." Id. at 442. 299
N.E.2d at 252, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 1006. Eleven of these witnesses were asked
during cross-examination if they were aware of "certain reports indicating that
[the co-defendant] had committed two acts of misconduct while serving as
Town Attorney ... " Id. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Id. at
446, 299 N.E.2d at 255, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
47. Id. at 443, 299 N.E.2d at 253, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. FED. R. EviD. 405.
51. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1996], Art. 12

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

not promoting "the truth-seeking process" because it "requires
rejection of the more reliable form of proof [which is] the
opinions of those in a position to know the accused's character,
while exposing the trier of fact to unverifiable hearsay of
unknown origin."' 5 3 Although the concerns of Van Gaasbeck
regarding the difficulty of determining whether or not the facts
upon which an opinion is based are well noted, it has been
argued that they can be eliminated by narrowly fashioning rules
concerning character evidence. 54 It has been asserted that Federal
Rule of Evidence 405 is tailored to "effectively eliminate[] any
prejudice or unfair surprise. ,,55
Federal Rule of Evidence 405 and the New York rule do,
however, have their similarities. Both rules, while allowing
evidence concerning a person's reputation, no longer limit the
evidence to the reputation in the community in which that person
lives. Moreover, the rules are similar regarding the type of
evidence admissible on cross-examination. Both allow inquiries
into specific instances of the defendant's conduct during the
cross-examination of a witness. Both rules also indicate that
questioning a witness about specific instances of conduct is done
to illustrate to the jury the reliability of the testimony of the
character witness.

53. People v. Barber, 74 N.Y.2d 653, 657, 541 N.E.2d 394, 396, 543
N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (1989) (Titone, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).

55. Id.
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